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Abstract—Distributed energy resources (DERs), such as
rooftop solar panels, are growing rapidly and are reshaping
power systems. To promote DERs, feed-in-tariff (FIT) is usually
adopted by utilities to pay DER owners certain fixed rates
for supplying energy to the grid. An alternative to FIT is
a market based approach; i.e., consumers and DER owners
trade energy in an auction-based peer-to-peer (P2P) market,
and the rates are determined by a market clearing process.
However, the complexities in sucha market and agents’ bounded
rationality may invalidate many well-established theories on
auction design and hinder market development. To address this
issue, we propose an automated bidding framework in a repeated
auction based on multi-armed bandit learning, which aims to
minimize each bidder’s cumulative regret. Numerical results
indicate convergence of such a multi-agent learning game to a
steady-state. For comparison purpose, we apply the framework
to three different auction designs to realize a P2P market.
Index Terms—bandit learning, double-side auction, decentral-
ized decision-making, energy market, multi-agent system
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed energy resources (DERs) are a vital part of a
smart grid, as such resources can improve system resilience
with their proximity to load and promote sustainability, with
the majority of DERs being solar and wind resources [1],
[2]. To incentivize investments in DERs, there are two gen-
eral approaches: non-market-based versus market-based. The
most common and widely used policy in a non-market-based
approach is feed-in-tariff (FIT) [3] (including net-metering).
While effective in promoting DERs, it may create equity issues
as consumers without DERs would face increased electricity
rates to pay for the FIT. In a market-based approach, a mar-
ketplace exists for consumers and DER owners, also referred
to as prosumers, to trade energy among themselves. The rates
that market participants pay/receive would fluctuate over time,
reflecting the dynamic supply and demand conditions.
In a bilateral marketplace, a leading mechanism to match
supply and demand is through a double-side auction. While
auction designs have been well studied in the field of eco-
nomics and game theory [4]–[7], several special features of
a peer-to-peer (P2P) energy market require special attention.
To name a few, a P2P energy market inherently involves
repeated auctions and exogenous uncertainties (e.g., wind/solar
availability), making the analysis of market participants’ bid-
ding/asking strategies much more difficult. In addition, market
participants are likely to have bounded rationality in the sense
that they may not even know their own valuation of energy
production and consumption (such as how much ‘utility’ it
would provide a consumer if he/she does dish washing at 8 PM
versus at 11 PM). Furthermore, their (implicit) valuations are
likely dependent. For example, in a hot summer day, all buyers
would value high of energy consumption for air conditioning.
This feature alone would nullify the assumptions of most of
the works in auction theory.
To address the theoretical difficulties, and to provide an
algorithmic-framework that can be automated to aid consumers
and prosumers to participate in a repeated double-auction,
we propose a multi-agent, multi-armed bandit learning ap-
proach. More specifically, consider a double-auction in which
buyers/sellers submit bids/asks in each time period h (e.g.,
hourly) in each day d. Within each h, we assume that market
participants only choose a price to ask/bid, not quantities of
energy. We further discretize per-unit price bids (i.e., ¢/KWh)
into K possible choices. When each agent decides which
price to bid/ask, it is similar to choosing one slot machine
to pull the arm, out of K such machines. In this case, the
agents are uncertain if they will win (bids cleared) or lose
(bids not cleared), and in the case of winning, how much
the payoff would be. This is similar to the classic multi-
armed bandit (MAB) learning problem that has been well
studied in the literature, such as [8]–[11]. A key difference
here, however, is that an agent’s probability of winning and
the payoff distributions (of each arm) depend on how other
market participants bid/ask, which give rise to a multi-agent
MAB game. In such a game, each agent solves their own
decision-making problem by choosing a learning algorithm.
Many such algorithms have been proposed in the literature,
such as the -greedy and variants of the Upper Confidence
Bound (UCB) algorithm [9]. A salient feature of the mutli-
agent MAB game is that it does not require all the agents to
use the same algorithm, nor does it require the agents to be
homogeneous (in terms of their preferences and feasible action
spaces).
We apply the mutli-agent MAB game framework and run
multiple simulations to study three different auction designs,
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all of which could be used to organize a P2P energy trading
market. The three auction designs are a replicate of the
wholesale market’s uniform-price auction, a variant of Vick-
rey double-side auction [5], and maximum volume matching
auction (which is pay-as-bid/receive-as-ask) [6]. Numerical
results indicate the convergence of the market outcomes of a
MAB game to a steady-state. Based on the simulations, from
market participants’ perspective, the uniform-price auction
outperforms the other two as it can offer higher cleared
quantities, total social welfare and total (normalized) rewards.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section
II, we describe in details how market participants bid/ask
through bandit learning in a double-side auction. In Section
III, three specific double-side auction designs to realize a P2P
energy trading market are presented. Numerical simulations
are shown in Section IV by comparing learning results in the
three different auction mechanisms. Section V concludes the
paper and identifies potential future research directions.
II. LEARNING UNDER MAB-GAME FRAMEWORK
Without a P2P energy market, DER owners can only sell
their generated energy to a utility company or an aggregator
at some pre-defined fixed FIT; similarly, they buy energy from
a utility at some fixed rate. With a bilateral P2P marketplace,
consumers and prosumers can trade with each other at rates
accepted by both sides. Intuitively, such a marketplace is
desirable to all participants if it can provide sellers with higher-
than-FIT rates and buyers lower rates than the utility’s fixed
rate. A double-side auction is arguably the most common
approach to organize a P2P market. While buyers/sellers in
such an auction can bid both price and quantities, as a starting
point, for the energy auction, we assume that participants only
bid prices.1
To help buyers/sellers decide what prices to bid/ask in a
repeated auction setting, we propose a regret-minimization-
based learning approach for a multi-agent system in which
bidding/asking prices of agents are automatically chosen by
bandit learning algorithms. For the ease of argument, we
present the model setup corresponding to a single trading-
period h (e.g. 1 hour), and the same bidding process is
repeated in every h. Thus we do not put an h index for all
the variables/parameters in the discussion. Consider a set of
agents A = Ab ∪As, where Ab and As are the sets of buyers
and sellers, respectively. Further, we let PFIT denote the FIT
rate, and P be the electricity rate charged by a utility, both
in ¢/KWh. It is reasonable to assume that PFIT < P (cause
otherwise, utilities will be losing money, which we assume to
be not reasonable, especially to investor-owned utilities).
A. Discrete Price Arms
The majority of DERs are solar and wind resources,2 and
thus we consider their generation marginal costs as zero,
1While market participants do not bid quantities in our study, the quantities
are not fixed however. They are stochastic as they are assumed to be from
wind/solar generation.
2As a starting point, we do not consider energy storage, and discuss the
challenges of including storage in Section V.
despite their fixed investment and installation fees (which are
sunk costs). Therefore, getting paid at any rate higher than FIT
for the energy they sell would be attractive to DER owners.
Similarly, energy buyers prefer any rate lower than the utility
rate. Therefore, any rate in the range [PFIT , P ] would be
preferred to both buyers and sellers. Let Pi denote the feasible
bidding/asking price space for each agent i; then we have
[PFIT , P ] ⊂ Pi. Note that it is not the other way around
since agents may be speculative in the sense that they may
bid/ask some extremely high/low unit prices to make their
bids/asks more likely to be accepted by the auction, and hence,
have better chances to earn the payoff associated with the
cleared bids. Even so, it is not unreasonable to assume that
Pi is bounded. As an MAB game is for decision-making with
discrete choices, we also assume that Pi is countable, which
is not restrictive either as prices can at most be of one cent
increment. Each discrete unit price in Pi is considered an ‘arm’
that an agent can choose to bid/ask into an auction.
B. Rewards
To facilitate the model setup, we need to introduce the
definition of normalized rewards, which take values between 0
and 1. To do so, we first define the benchmark rewards. Let qi
denote the demand/supply of agent i, with qi < 0 for buyers
(i.e. i ∈ Ab), and qi > 0 for sellers (i.e., i ∈ As). For a buyer,
we define the lower and upper benchmarks as buying all of
qi at P and PFIT , respectively. In the opposite, a seller agent
has its lower and upper benchmarks defined as selling qi at
PFIT and P . Using an indicator function, such as 1{i∈Ab} to
denote that agent i is a buyer if 1{i∈Ab} = 1, and a seller if
it is 0, we can write out the uniform mathematical formulas
of the lower benchmark reward (denoted by Λi) and upper
benchmark reward (denoted by Λi) as
Λi = qi · [P · 1{i∈Ab} + PFIT · 1{i∈As}], and (1)
Λi = qi · [PFIT · 1{i∈Ab} + P · 1{i∈As}]. (2)
In an auction setting, the participants send/receive pay-
ments based on the cleared results. Specifically, each agent’s
sent/received payment is calculated according to the agent’s
cleared price, paui , and cleared quantity, q
au
i , as below
Λaui = p
au
i · qaui , i ∈ A. (3)
In (3), the cleared price paui is always nonnegative, while q
au
i
can be positive or negative, the same way as how qi is defined
earlier. Hence, Λaui can be positive (for sellers) or negative (for
buyers). Note that in auctions like the uniform-price double-
side auction, there is only one market clearing price. While in
some other auctions, such as the maximum volume matching
auction to be introduced in Section III-D, it is pay-as-bid for
buyers, and receive-as-asked for sellers. Hence, each agent’s
cleared price paui may be different.
Even in a P2P energy trading market, it is not necessary (or
possible) for all agents to buy/sell energy in the P2P market,
as some agents’ bids/asks may not be (fully) cleared by the
market, or there is over supply or over demand in the market.
For the uncleared demand, we assume that the corresponding
buyers buy from the utility at the rate P , and for uncleared
supply, the corresponding sellers sell to the utility at the FIT
PFIT . We denote the sent/received payment to/from the utility
for agent i by Λuti , and its value is
Λuti = p
ut
i · quti , (4)
where puti = PFIT if i ∈ As and puti = P if i ∈ Ab,
and quti denotes the uncleared quantity. The total sent/received
payment of each agent ∀i ∈ A (denoted by Λi) is then the sum
of Λaui and Λ
ut
i :
Λi = Λ
au
i + Λ
ut
i . (5)
When agent i’s auction cleared price paui is in [PFIT , P ],
it is easy to see that Λi ∈ [Λi,Λi], and we can define the
normalized reward pii as follows:
pii = (Λi − Λi)/(Λi − Λi), (6)
In Eq. (6), clearly pii ∈ [0, 1]. If paui = PFIT , then a buyer
has pii = 1 since Λi = Λi; while a seller has pii = 0. If
paui = P , then the opposite is true. However, as we mentioned
earlier, agents may bid/ask prices that are outside the range of
[PFIT , P ]. Though it is counter-intuitive, the auction cleared
price paui could also be outside [PFIT , P ]. In the case that
paui < PFIT , we let pii = 1|i∈Ab and pii = 0|i∈As ; for paui >
P , we let pii = 0|i∈Ab and pii = 1|i∈As . Together with Eq.
(6), we have that
pii =

1 · 1{i∈Ab} + 0 · 1{i∈As}, for paui < PFIT
(Λi − Λi)/(Λi − Λi), for PFIT ≤ paui ≤ P
0 · 1{i∈Ab} + 1 · 1{i∈As}, for paui > P,
(7)
where Λi, Λi, and Λi are as defined in Eq. (1), (2), and (5), re-
spectively. Converting the actual reward an agent receives/pays
in a double-side auction, which can be positive or negative,
into the normalize reward, which is always in [0, 1] for both
buyers and sellers, can greatly simplify both the model setup
for the MAB-game and the bidding algorithm design.
C. Pricing by Bandit Learning
As in Eq. (7), we can see that agent i’s reward pii highly
depends on its cleared price in an auction, which further
depends on the collective actions of the other bidders/sellers.
In addition, the same auction is being repeated indefinitely,
but the set of buyers/sellers may change from rounds to
rounds. Such a situation is an instance of a dynamic game
of incomplete information, one of the hardest subject in game
theory. Incomplete information means that the players do not
know the other players’ payoff functions or feasible action
spaces, nor do they know how many players are in the
game. Also in a general dynamic game, as opposed to in
a so-called repeated game, the set of players may change
(randomly) over time. The standard equilibrium concept for
dynamic games of incomplete information is Perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (PBNE) [12], [13]. A PBNE consists of the
collection of each player’s strategy profile, which is a function
that maps the entire history of the game to each player’s
feasible set of actions, under the assumption that each player
updates their beliefs of other players’ payoff functions based
on the Bayes’ rule. Not only the assumptions of PBNE are
too strong, as it requires each agent to maximize expected
payoff (given that other players choosing their corresponding
PBNE strategy) over all possible histories of the game, or is
such an equilibrium computable, as it would require to find
the best strategy profile, which is a function mapping, over
the functional space of all possible mappings, leading to an
infinite-dimension optimization problem.
To avoid the technical difficulties associated with PBNE,
most of the the strong assumptions need to be relaxed. Specif-
ically, we may want to relax the Bayes’ updating assumption,
and allow consumers to just use a “good enough” strategy,
instead of using the best possible strategy. One way to quantify
a “good enough” strategy is to use the concept of regret, which
measures the cumulative differences between what the best
action would be in hindsight and what the agent’s chosen
action was in the past round of the game. The various MAB
learning algorithms in literature are exactly designed to help an
agent choose actions in such a dynamic setting, with provable
upper bounds on the cumulative regret. Hence, when the
number of rounds of the decision-making goes to infinity, the
cumulative regret approaches to 0. However, almost all such
algorithms are designed for a single agent, and an underlying
assumption for proving bounds on cumulative regret is that
the reward distribution associated with each arm (i.e., each
feasible action from a finite, discrete space), though unknown
to the agent, is stationary. Such an assumption is clearly not
true in a multi-agent game, as each arm’s reward distribution
depends on collectively what the agents do. This lack of
stationarity may be the major reason that why there has been
very little work on multi-agent MAB games. However, a recent
breakthrough on MAB games in [14] proposes a new concept
for such a game with a large number of agents, referred to
as a mean-field steady state (MFSS). While it is not a Nash
equilibrium in general, in the sense that individual agents may
have incentives to deviate from their current strategy profile,
the keen idea is that when the number of agent is large,
the population profile, defined as the histogram of the arm
choices of all agents, becomes stabilize as the game continues.
Consequently, each arm’s reward distribution indeed becomes
stationary. Also in [14], it is shown that a MFSS exists and is
unique under mild conditions.
The game setting in [14] is nonetheless very simple. Here
we show that the MAB-game framework can indeed be applied
to the complex setting of a double-side auction. Specifically,
assume that there are K arms in each of agent i’s action
space Pi. Let f(k), k = 1, . . . ,K denote the percentage of
the agents that choose arm k in a particular period h of the
auction, and we refer f = (f(1), . . . , f(K)) as the population
profile. Then in period h, agent i’s normalized reward pii (as
defined in (7)) is a function of f and his/her own choice k.
Agent i’s optimal reward in h can be expressed as
pi∗i (f) = max
k∈Pi
E[pii(f , k)]. (8)
Suppose that for the trading-period h across D days, agent i
uses a policy σ, which is an algorithm (aka a mapping) that
chooses an arm from Pi for the next time period based on
agent i’s own payoff history.3 Though the underling optimal
reward pi∗i (f) is unknown to the agent, a policy σ can enable
the agent to learn about the distributions of rewards for each
price arm. Let Γσ(D, k) be the number of times price arm k
has been chosen by the policy σ during all the D rounds. We
define agent i’s cumulative regret under the policy σ for every
D rounds as follows:
∆σ = pi
∗
i (f) ·D −
∑
k∈Pi
E[pii(f , k) · Γσ(D, k)]. (9)
The regret ∆σ in Eq. (9) is the expected loss due to the fact
that the policy does not necessarily always choose the optimal
price arm under the population profile f , which is unknown
to the agent. The policy σ is a no-regret bandit learning policy
if the regret in Eq. (9) satisfies:
1
D
∆σ < R(D,K), (10)
for some function R = o(D). For the bandit learning algo-
rithms based on UCB [9], such as UCB1, UCB-tuned and
UCB2, it is known that they can yield logarithmic regret
bounds; that is, R(D,K) = α(K) · 1D ln(D).
III. DOUBLE AUCTION DESIGNS
In this section, we first define the individual monetary
utility, corresponding total social welfare, and auctioneer’s
profit with a P2P energy market auction. Then we discuss
three different double-side auction designs that can be applied
to clear a P2P market: the uniform-price auction, a variant
of Vickrey double-side auction [5], and the maximum volume
matching auction [6].
A. Social Welfare and Auctioneer’s Profit
As mentioned previously, energy consumers rarely know the
precise valuation of the utility associated with their energy
production or consumption. To define agents’ individual mon-
etary utility, we consider it to be the profit for energy sellers
and cost reduction for buyers who participate the P2P market.
Since for renewable DER owners, their marginal production
costs are zero, the total profit of energy seller i ∈ As is then
ui|i∈As = paui · qaui + PFIT · quti , (11)
which has the same value as Λi in Eq. (5). For consumers,
they have to pay at P without a P2P market, thus we have the
cost reduction as
ui|i∈Ab = (P − paui ) · |qaui |. (12)
3This is a key difference from PBNE, in which a strategy profile needs to
map the entire history of the game, including the past payoffs or actions of
all the players.
Fig. 1. A uniform-price double auction market.
We refer to the summation of all agents’ utility as total social
welfare; i.e. UA =
∑
i∈A ui.
For the auctioneer (which can be played by the utility or a
so-called distribution system operator (DSO)), the total auction
trading surplus (denoted by UM) is the sum of bid-ask price
difference for each energy unit traded in the auction, which is
calculated as below
UM =
∑
i∈Ab
(paui · |qaui |)−
∑
i∈As
(paui · qaui ). (13)
B. Uniform-Price Double-Side Auction
As plotted in Fig. 1, the intersection (P ∗, Q∗) of the supply
and demand curves determine the market clearing price (and
quantity) in a uniform-price double-side auction. All agents
pay/receive at the uniform price P ∗, and a total of Q∗ units
of energy are traded in the auction. It is assumed that the
uncleared supply, max(Qs−Q∗, 0), is sold to a utility at PFIT ,
in which Qs =
∑
i∈As qi is the total energy supplied by DERs.
Similarly, uncleared demand, if any, is purchased from the
utility at P . Therefore, in Fig. 1, the shaded area in light
purple represents the total social welfare UA, i.e.
UA = P ·Q∗ + PFIT ·max(Qs −Q∗, 0). (14)
Since paui = P
∗ for all agents i ∈ A, and both ∑i∈Ab |qaui |
and
∑
i∈As q
au
i are equal to Q
∗, by Eq. (13) the auctioneer
earns zero profit; i.e. UM = 0.
C. Vickrey Variant Double-Side Auction
Instead of paying/receiving the uniform equilibrium price,
we consider a Vickrey-like double-side auction as intro-
duced in [5]. The mechanism works as follows. Similar to
the uniform-price auction, all bids/asks are sorted decreas-
ingly/increasingly, and we can have stair-wise demand/supply
curves as shown in Fig. 2, in which each stair represents
the collective bids/asks at price arm pbn/psm. At the critical
intersection point (P ∗, Q∗) where the aggregate demand and
supply meet, there are collective bid (pbN , qbN ) and ask
Fig. 2. A Vickrey-like double auction market (Case I).
(psM , qsM ). Then we consider two cases. Case I (as shown
in Fig. 2):
pbN ≥ psM ≥ pbN+1, (15)
M−1∑
m=1
qsm ≤
N∑
n=1
qbn ≤
M∑
m=1
qsm, (16)
and Case II:
psM+1 ≥ pbN ≥ psM , (17)
N−1∑
n=1
qbn ≤
M∑
m=1
qsn ≤
N∑
n=1
qbm. (18)
Herein, we describe the clear mechanism for Case I; Case
II is similar.
Rule 1: If
∑N−1
n=1 qbn ≥
∑M−1
m=1 qsm, there is overdemand.
All the asks with m < M sell all their supply qsm at price
psM ; all the asks with m ≥M sell their supply at PFIT to the
utility. All the bids with n < N buy at pbN and each of them
buys a volume equal to qbn−(
∑N−1
n=1 qbn−
∑M−1
m=1 qsm)/(N−
1); all the uncleared bids buy at P from the utility.
Rule 2: If
∑N−1
n=1 qbn ≤
∑M−1
m=1 qsm, there is oversupply.
All the bids with n < N buy all their demand qbn at price
pbN ; all the bids with n ≥ N buy from a utility at P . All
the asks with m < M sell at psM and each of them sells a
volume equal to qsm− (
∑M−1
m=1 qsm−
∑N−1
n=1 qbn)/(M − 1);
all the unsuccessful asks sell at PFIT to the utility.
According to the clear rules, the total trade volume in the
auction is
Qau = min(
N−1∑
n=1
qbn,
M−1∑
m=1
qsm). (19)
Then the total social welfare for all agents can be calculated
as below (which is represented by the light purple area in Fig.
2)
UA = [(P − pbN ) + psM ] ·Qau + PFIT · (Qs −Qau). (20)
Fig. 3. A maximum volume matching auction market.
The auctioneer’s profit represented by the yellow shaded
area in Fig. 2 is as below
UM = (pbN − psM ) ·Qau. (21)
D. Maximum Volume Matching Double-Side Auction
Other than aiming to maximize social welfare for agents
or profit for the acutionner, the auction design proposed in
[6] is to maximize the traded volume with given a set of
bids and asks. The idea of market clear can be intuitively
illustrated in Fig. 3. Suppose that the demand/supply curves
are based on the bids/asks shown in Fig 1. The supply curve is
flipped horizontally and then shifted right towards the demand
curve until the two curves touch. The distance (denoted by
Qau) the flipped supply curve can move is the minimal
horizontal distance between the flipped supply curve and the
demand curve, which is exactly the maximum trading volume
achievable by the auction. For energy quantity from 0 to Qau,
the corresponding bids (pbn, qbn) on the demand curve and
asks (psm, qsm) on the shifted supply curve are matched, and
then successfully matched buyers/sellers pay/receive at their
bid/ask price, respectively. Let Sb and Sa denote the set of
successful bids and asks, respectively. As before, uncleared
supply is assumed to be sold to a utility at PFIT , and uncleared
demand is bought at from the utility at P .
According to the clearing mechanism, the total social wel-
fare of all agents is as below (represented by the light purple
area in Fig. 3):
UA =
∑
n∈Sb
(P −pbn)qbn+
∑
m∈Sa
psmqsm+PFIT (Qs−Qau).
(22)
The auctioneer’s profit is still the auction trading surplus
(represented by the yellow shadow area in Fig. 3) as below:
UM =
∑
n∈Sb
(pbn · qbn)−
∑
m∈Sa
(psm · qsm). (23)
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we apply the MAB-game framework to
study the market outcomes of three different auction designs
to realize a P2P energy trading market.
A. Input Data
1) Decision epochs and temporal resolution: As a starting
point, we do not consider time-linking constraints in our
models, and each trading window is independent of others in
a day. The simulations presented herein concern a single one-
hour trading period for the peak hour 17:00 - 18:00 across 300
days, i.e. D = 300.
2) P , FIT and decision space: We choose P = 11 ¢/KWh
and PFIT = 5 ¢/KWh. All agents have the same decision
space Pi that contains all the discretized price arms from 0¢/KWh to 14 ¢/KWh of one cent increment. Hence, each agent
has 15 arms (including 0 ¢/KWh) to choose from in each round
of the auction.
3) Bandit learning algorithms for pricing: For choosing
price arms to bid/ask in the auctions, each agent i ∈ A can
choose one of the four learning algorithms: UCB1, UCB-
tuned, UCB2, and −greedy, with equal probabilities. Details
of such algorithms (for a single agent) can be found in [9].
4) Consumers: In the numerical test cases, we simulate
2000 distributed residential household consumers that par-
ticipate in the auctions, i.e. |Ab| = 2000. According to the
Residential Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS)
by U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) [15], a
residential customer consumes about 30 KWh per day on
average. Considering that it is a peak hour, we let consumers
repeatedly sample their energy demand quantities from a
Uniform distribution U(1.5, 2) in KWh, independently, for
the same hour across days, which is slightly higher than the
average consumption level per hour.
5) Prosumers: On the sell-side, we also consider 2000
prosumers with DERs, i.e. |As| = 2000. For the DERs, we
only consider two renewable resources, solar and wind, in this
work. Due to the popularity of distributed residential solar
panels, we assume that 4/5 of the prosumers have solar-based
distrbuted generation; while the other 1/5 have wind-based. In
the simulations, we use the System Advisor Model (SAM) [16]
developed by National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)
to model residential generation output by solar and wind. The
weather resource data for the state of Arizona from NREL is
used as inputs for the SAM model.
For solar PV generation, we assume that all panels have
nameplate capacity of 2 KWdc, with DC to AC ratio of 1.2
and inverter efficiency of 96%. For each solar PV owner, the
module type and array type have equal chance to be one of
{Standard, Premium, Thin Film} and {Fixed Open Rack, Fixed
Root Mount, 1 Axis Tracking, 1 Axis Backtracking, 2 Axis
Tracking}, respectively. All other inputs are set as default in
the Photovoltaic PVWatts simulations for distributed residen-
tial in SAM. More details about photovoltaic simulations can
be found in [16], [17].
For the simulations of distributed residential wind gener-
ation, each wind-based prosumer samples its turbine model
uniformly from the 8 wind turbine models listed in Table I, and
the number of turbines owned by the prosumer is uniformly
sampled among 1 through 4. All other inputs are set as default
TABLE I
WIND TURBINE MODELS
Model KW Rating
Energy Ball HEA V100 1.1m 0.6KW 0.5
Bergey BWC XL.1 1
True North Power Arrow 2m 1KW 1.23
Future Energy FE1048U 1.8m 1KW 1.5
Hummer 3.1m 1KW 2
Energy Ball HEA V200 1.98m 2.5KW 2.23
Southwest Windpower Skystream 3.7m 1.9KW 2.63
Westwind 3.7m 3KW 3.1
in the Wind Residential simulations in SAM. The turbines’
specifications, such as wind power curves and turbine layout,
can be found in [16], [17].
B. Numerical Results
In the following, we use UP, VV, and MV to denote uniform
price auction, Vickrey variant auction, and maximum volume
matching auction, respectively. In Fig. 4, the cleared quantities
of the auctions are presented, and we can see the trend of
convergence to a steady state. A counter-intuitive observation
is that in the later phase, UP is more likely to have a higher
level of traded volume than MV, even though MV is designed
to maximize traded volume. The reason is that with bandit
learning, agents are updating their bids/asks dynamically, and
thus the collective bids/asks schedules are not necessarily the
same across different auctions. (With the same set of bids/asks,
MV will yield the most cleared quantity for sure.) Besides the
volume, we can see after a while of learning, UP’s total cleared
quantity has smaller volatility than the other two auction
designs. Therefore, in terms of auction cleared quantity, UP
outperforms VV and MV, and thus the auction design can let
more renewable DERs be utilized in a P2P market.
Similar to the cleared quantity, agents’ total social welfare
also shows the trend of convergence, as seen in Fig. 5.
Associated with more cleared quantity, buyers and sellers in
UP have higher social welfare than in the other two auctions in
the later auctions. The performance of VV and MV are close
to each other. Accordingly, for the total normalized reward,
the results display very similar patterns as shown in Fig. 6.
Though UP outperforms the other two auctions for bene-
fiting market participants and incentivizing DERs, it may not
be preferred by the auctioneer. As discussed in Section III,
the auctioneer earns no profit in UP due to the zero trading
surplus. According to simulation results, the auctioneer can
achieve the most profit in MV, though the profit fluctuations
of MV are much higher than VV’s.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a MAB-game approach to help
market participants choose prices for their energy bid/ask
in a P2P double-side auction. The bandit learning approach
allows each agent to make a decision based only on his/her
own history, which makes this approach implementable in
real-world settings. We conduct simulations based on the
MAB-game framework under three different auction designs,
Fig. 4. Total clear energy quantities (KWh) in the auctions.
Fig. 5. Total social welfare ($) of all buyers and sellers in the auctions.
and the results indicate the convergence of cleared quan-
tities, total social welfare and total normalized reward for
agents. Moreover, based on simulation results, the uniform-
price double auction appear to outperform the other two in
terms of market participants’ benefits. For the auctioneer, the
maximum volume matching offers the highest profit. For future
research directions, a pressing need is to investigate how to
incorporate time-linking constraints in the MAB-framework so
that energy storage can be explicitly considered. Another need
is to verify if the technical conditions in [14] for the existence
and uniqueness of a MFSS are satisfied in the specific game
setting here.
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